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Abstract 
Recent claims, mainly from computer scientists, concerning a largely automated and model-
free data-intensive science have been countered by critical reactions from a number of 
philosophers of science. The debate suffers from a lack of detail in two respects, regarding (i) 
the actual methods used in data-intensive science and (ii) the specific ways in which these 
methods presuppose theoretical assumptions. I examine two widely-used algorithms, 
classificatory trees and non-parametric regression, and argue that these are theory-laden in an 
external sense, regarding the framing of research questions, but not in an internal sense 
concerning the causal structure of the examined phenomenon. With respect to the novelty of 
data-intensive science, I draw an analogy to exploratory as opposed to theory-directed 
experimentation. 
1. Introduction 
Over the past decade, computer scientists have claimed that a new scientific methodology has 
become possible through advances in information technology (e.g. Gray 2007). This approach 
is supposed to be data-driven, strongly inductive, and relatively theory-independent. The 
epistemology of such data-intensive science has recently emerged as a novel topic in 
philosophy of science. Generally, the reactions have been rather critical, often referring to the 
more or less trivial observation that some kind of theory-ladenness always occurs in scientific 
research. But, as I will argue, this means throwing the baby out with the bathwater, since 
interesting shifts in the role of theory can indeed be observed when examining specific 
methods employed in data-intensive science. 
In Section 2, I will suggest a definition for data-intensive science reflecting those features that 
are interesting from an epistemological perspective. I will then, in Section 3, briefly introduce 
the debate on theory-ladenness in data-intensive science. To assess the various arguments, I 
will discuss two algorithms that are widely used, namely classificatory trees (Section 4) and 
non-parametric regression (Section 5). For both of these methods, I will point out the specific 
ways in which theory has to be presupposed to identify causal connections and thus yield 
reliable predictions. I will conclude in Section 6 that these algorithms require an external 
theory-ladenness concerning the framing of research questions, but little internal theory-
ladenness concerning the causal structure of the examined phenomena. I will also point out 
remarkable analogies to the analysis of theory-ladenness in exploratory experimentation. 
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2. Defining data-intensive science 
The problems usually addressed in data-intensive science bear close resemblance to standard 
problems in statistics. They concern classification or regression of an output variable y with 
respect to a large number of input parameters x, also called predictor variables or covariates, 
on the basis of large training sets. The main differences compared with conventional problems 
in statistics consist in the high-dimensionality of the input variable and the amount of data 
available about various configurations or states of the system. For example, an internet store 
wants to know how likely someone buys a certain product depending on surf history, various 
cookies and a user profile as well as based on data of other users who have either bought or 
failed to buy the product. A medical researcher examines which combinations of genetic and 
environmental factors are responsible for a certain disease. A political adviser is interested 
how likely a specific individual is going to vote for a certain candidate based on a profile 
combining for example voting history, political opinions, general demographics, or consumer 
data.  
In a classification problem, the output variable has a finite number of possible values. In a 
regression problem, the output variable is continuous. In order to establish an adequate and 
reliable model, extensive training and test data is needed. Each instance in the training and 
test sets gives a value for the output variable dependent on at least some of the input 
parameters. The training data is used to build the model, e.g. determine relevant parameters, 
the test data to validate and verify the model. Using part of the data to determine the accuracy 
of a model is commonly referred to as cross-validation.
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In this essay, we cannot delve into all the technical details of the various algorithms employed 
in data-intensive science, such as support vector machines, forests or neural networks. Instead 
we will look at two simple but widely-used algorithms, namely classificatory trees and non-
parametric regression, to examine how much and what kind of theory must be presupposed in 
order for these algorithms to yield meaningful results. 
The term data-intensive science is notoriously blurry, as has been emphasized for example by 
Sabina Leonelli: ‘a general characterisation of data-driven methods is hard to achieve, given 
the wide range of activities and epistemic goals currently subsumed under this heading.’ 
(2012, 1) However, in order to say something substantial about the role of theory, we have to 
be more specific about the kinds of practices we want to include as data-intensive science 
even if an exact definition does not fully correspond to common usage of the term.  
In the computer science literature, various definitions have been proposed for the closely 
related concepts of a data deluge or of big data. Most of these refer to the pure amount of 
information or to the technical challenges that such ‘big data’ poses in terms of the so-called 
‘three Vs’—volume, velocity and variety of data (Laney 2001). However, from a philosophy 
of science perspective, these definitions do not provide much insight. After all, larger amounts 
of data do not automatically imply interesting methodological developments. 
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 An excellent introductory textbook is Russell & Norvig (2009). 
Leonelli, partly following Gray (2007, xix), identifies two characteristic features for data-
intensive methodology: ‘one is the intuition that induction from existing data is being 
vindicated as a crucial form of scientific inference, which can guide and inform experimental 
research; and the other is the central role of machines, and thus of automated reasoning, in 
extracting meaningful patterns from data.’ (2012, 1) She adds that these features are 
themselves quite controversial and criticizes that they are difficult to apply in research 
contexts. 
In defining data-intensive science, I largely follow Leonelli, while attempting to be more 
precise about the type of induction. I will argue that eliminative induction in the tradition of 
Mill’s methods4 plays the crucial role. The first part of my definition thus focusses on the 
premises that are necessary to carry out eliminative induction: data-intensive science requires 
(I) data representing all relevant configurations of the examined phenomenon with respect to 
a specific research question. For complex phenomena, this implies high-dimensional data, i.e. 
data sets involving many parameters, as well as a large number of observations or instances 
covering a wide range of combinations of these parameters. We will see later that this premise 
underwrites the characteristic data-driven and inductive nature of data-intensive science. 
(II) The second feature concerns the automation of the entire scientific process, from data 
capture to processing to modeling (cp. Gray 2007, xix). This allows sidestepping some of the 
limitations of the human cognitive apparatus but also leads to a loss in human understanding 
regarding the results of data-intensive science. Again, being more precise about the type of 
induction allows to determine under which circumstances automation is really possible. 
3. Theory-free science? 
Proponents of data-intensive science claim that important changes are happening with respect 
to the role of theory. An extreme, but highly influential version of such a statement is by the 
former editor-in-chief of Wired Chris Anderson, who notoriously proclaimed ‘the end of 
theory’ altogether (2008). More nuanced positions can be found for example in the writings of 
Google research director Peter Norvig (2009): ‘Having more data, and more ways to process 
it, means that we can develop different kinds of theories and models.’ Simpler models with a 
lot of data supposedly trump more elaborate models with less data (Halevy et al. 2009, 9).  
A number of philosophers have objected to claims of a theory-free science—generally by 
pointing out various kinds of theory-ladenness. For example, Werner Callebaut writes: ‘We 
know from Kuhn, Feyerabend, and […] Popper that observations (facts, data) are theory-
laden. Popper […] rejected the “bucket theory of knowledge” in favor of the “searchlight 
theory,” according to which observation “is a process in which we play an intensely active 
part.” Our perceptions are always preceded by interests, questions, or expectations—in short, 
by something “speculative”.’ (Callebaut 2012, 74) Leonelli concurs in her work on big data 
biology: ‘Using data for the purposes of discovery can happen in a variety of ways, and 
involves a complex ensemble of skills and methodological components. Inferential reasoning 
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 not to be confused with a looser use of the same term in the sense of eliminating hypotheses until only the 
correct one remains 
from data is tightly interrelated with specific theoretical commitments about the nature of the 
biological phenomena under investigation, as well as with experimental practices through 
which data are produced, tested and modelled. For instance, extracting biologically 
meaningful inferences from high-throughput genomic data may involve reliance on theories 
about gene expression and regulation, models of the biological processes being regulated and 
familiarity with the instruments and organisms from which data were obtained. In this 
context, “inductive” clearly does not mean “hypothesis-free”; nor can automated reasoning be 
seen as a substitute to human judgment based on specific expertise and laboratory 
experience.’ (2012, 2)  
Certainly, the idea of an entirely theory- or model-free science is absurd. So, Callebaut and 
Leonelli rightly point out various kinds of theoretical assumptions that enter scientific 
analyses. But this kind of argument turns out too general and in the end fails to do justice to 
the remarkable shift towards a strongly inductive approach. Thus, the interesting question is in 
which ways data-intensive science is indeed theory-laden, and, more importantly, in which 
sense it can be theory-free. To provide an answer, we now take a detailed look at two 
algorithms that are widely employed, namely classificatory trees and non-parametric 
regression. We link these methods to eliminative induction and then determine the kind of 
theoretical knowledge that has to be presupposed.   
4. First case study: classificatory trees 
Classificatory trees (e.g. Russell & Norvig 2010, Ch. 18.3.3) are used to determine whether a 
certain instance belongs to a particular group A depending on a number of parameters C1, …, 
CN and thus perfectly match the scheme of data-intensive problems as described in Section 2. 
With help of training data, the tree is set up recursively. First, the parameter CX is determined 
that contains the largest amount of information with respect to the classification of the 
training data, as formally measured in terms of Shannon entropy. If CX classifies all instances 
correctly, the procedure is terminated. Otherwise, two subproblems remain, namely 
classifying when CX is present and when it is absent. This step is repeated until either all 
instances are classified correctly or no potential classifiers are left. If the algorithm is 
successful, the resulting tree structure gives a Boolean expression of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for A, which can be interpreted as a complex scientific law: e.g. if (C3C2 ˅ 
C4¬C2)C1 ˅ C6C5¬C1, then A. 
The framing of classificatory trees in particular and of problems in data-intensive science in 
general in terms of a mapping of boundary conditions to an outcome variable fits well with 
eliminative induction as exemplified in John Stuart Mill’s methods of elimination (1886, Bk. 
III, Ch. VIII) with a predecessor in Francis Bacon’s method of exclusion (1620/1994, Bk. 2). 
While until the end of the 19
th
 century, Bacon’s approach was widely considered the 
methodological foundation for modern science, eliminative induction has not been very 
popular since. So, there exist comparably few modern accounts, including von Wright (1951), 
Mackie (1965, appendix), Skyrms (2000), Baumgartner & Grasshoff (2004), Pietsch (2014).
5
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 In the following, I will largely rely on the last account. 
In eliminative induction, a phenomenon A is examined under the systematic variation of 
potentially relevant boundary conditions C1, …, CN with the aim of establishing causal 
relevance or irrelevance of these conditions, relative to a certain context or background B 
consisting of further boundary conditions. The best known and arguably most effective 
method is the so-called method of difference that establishes causal relevance of a boundary 
condition CX by comparing two instances which differ only in CX and agree in all other 
circumstances C. If in one instance, both CX and A are present and in the other both CX and 
A are absent, then CX is causally relevant to A. There is a twin method to the method of 
difference that one might call the strict method of agreement, which establishes causal 
irrelevance, if the change in CX has no influence on A. Eliminative induction can deal with 




Thus, causal (ir-)relevance is a three-place relation: a boundary condition C is (ir-)relevant to 
a phenomenon A with respect to a certain background B of further conditions that remain 
constant if causally relevant or are allowed to vary if causally irrelevant. The restriction to a 
context B is necessary because there is no guarantee that in a different context B*, the causal 
relation between C and A will continue to hold. Causal laws established by eliminative 
induction thus have a distinctive contextual or ceteris-paribus character. Extensive 
information about all potentially relevant boundary conditions in as many different situations 
as possible is necessary to establish reliable causal knowledge by means of eliminative 
induction. Exactly this kind of information is provided in data-intensive science. 
Eliminative induction corresponds to a difference-making account of causality, which is 
closely related to the counterfactual approach. However, the truth-value of counterfactuals is 
now determined via the method of difference or the direct method of agreement, and thus by 
comparison with actual situations that differ from the counterfactual statement only in terms 
of irrelevant circumstances, and not by a possible-world semantics as in traditional 
counterfactual approaches like that of David Lewis. 
Obviously, classificatory trees rely on eliminative induction. Thus, to assess their quality, one 
has to look at the premises required for eliminative methods to yield the correct causes. Partial 
analyses of this problem are given for example in Keynes (1921, Ch. 22), von Wright (1951, 
Ch. V), Baumgartner & Grasshoff (2004, Sec. IX 2.4), Pietsch (2014, Sec. 3f). We will again 
follow the exposition in the last reference. There are at least three main assumptions: (i) 
determinism, i.e. that the phenomenon A is fully determined by boundary conditions C and 
background B; (ii) constancy of the background, i.e. that no relevant parameters in the 
background change when two instances are compared via the method of difference or the 
strict method of agreement; and finally (iii) an adequate vocabulary, that the parameters C 
reflect suitable causal categories for the given context B. Applied to classificatory trees, we 
can for example say: if there is a single sufficient condition CX among the C and there is 
sufficient data in terms of instances of the system in various configurations to avoid spurious 
correlations, then the classificatory tree algorithm will return CX as cause. Certainly, these 
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 For further discussion, see Pietsch (2014). 
assumptions are quite strong. And there are supposedly weaker constraints for causal relations 
of statistical nature, but this issue goes beyond the scope of the present paper.  
We can now identify the elements of theory that have to be presupposed. In particular: (a) one 
has to know all parameters C that are potentially relevant for the phenomenon A in a given 
context determined by the background B; (b) one has to assume that for all collected instances 
and observations the relevant background conditions remain the same, i.e. a stable context B; 
(c) one has to have good reasons to expect that the parameters C are formulated in stable 
causal categories that are adequate for a specific research question; (d) there must be a 
sufficient number of instances to cover all potentially relevant configurations of the 
phenomenon. If such theoretical knowledge can be established, then there is enough data to 
avoid spurious correlations and to map the causal structure of the phenomenon without further 
internal theoretical assumptions about the phenomenon.  
This motivates and explains the definition of data-intensive science given in Section 2. In 
particular, premise (I) is the fundamental condition allowing for a strongly inductive approach 
based on parameter variation. This viewpoint is further corroborated by the fact that in many 
cases data-driven approaches become effective rather suddenly—a transition point that could 
be called a data threshold (Halevy et al. 2009). Halevy et al. give a plausible explanation for 
its existence: ‘For many tasks, once we have a billion or so examples, we essentially have a 
closed set that represents (or at least approximates) what we need, without generative rules.’ 
(2009, 9) At this threshold, the data represents a large fraction of the relevant configurations 
of the considered phenomenon. 
Of course, in scientific practice full theoretical knowledge a) to d) is rarely available. 
However, in general, including more potentially relevant parameters C will increase the 
probability that the actual cause of A might be among them, while admittedly also increasing 
the probability for spurious correlations, i.e. that boundary conditions accidentally produce 
the right classification. However, more data in terms of instances of different configurations 
can reduce the probability for such spurious correlations. Thus, more data in terms of 
parameters and instances will generally increase the chance that correct causal relations are 
identified by data-intensive algorithms. 
5. Second case study: non-parametric regression 
A recent paradigm shift in statistics closely mirrors the change from a hypothesis-directed to a 
more inductive, data-driven approach. It has been described as a transition from parametric to 
non-parametric modeling (e.g. Wassermann 2006; Russell & Norvig 2010, Ch. 18.8), from 
data to algorithmic models (Breiman 2001), or from model-based to model-free approaches. 
Since the shift concerns methodology and not theoretical or empirical content, it differs in 
important ways from scientific revolutions. Nevertheless, the statistics community has 
experienced over the past two decades some of the social ramifications and ‘culture clashes’ 
that are typical for scientific paradigm shifts as documented for example in Breiman (2001) or 
in Norvig’s dispute with Noam Chomsky on data-driven machine translation (Norvig 2011). 
This paradigm shift has the following basic features: i) Parametric methods usually 
presuppose considerable modeling assumptions. In particular, they summarize the data in 
terms of a ‘small’ number of model parameters specifying for example a Gaussian distribution 
or linear dependence, hence the name. By contrast, non-parametric modeling presupposes few 
modeling assumptions, e.g. allows for a wide range of functional dependencies or of 
distribution functions. ii) In non-parametric modeling, predictions are calculated on the basis 
of ‘all’ data. There is no detour over a parametric model that summarizes the data in terms of 
a few parameters. iii) While this renders non-parametric modeling quite flexible with the 
ability to quickly react to unexpected data, it also becomes extremely data- and calculation-
intensive. This aspect accounts for the fact that non-parametric modeling is a relatively recent 
development in scientific method strongly dependent on advances in information technology. 
It has largely emerged in parallel with the rise of data-intensive science. 
Let me give a simple example as an illustration, the comparison between parametric and non-
parametric regression. In a parametric univariate linear regression problem, one has 
reasonable grounds to suspect that a number of given data points (xi;yi) can be summarized in 
terms of a linear dependency: y = ax + b. Thus, two parameters need to be determined, offset 
b and slope a, which are usually chosen such that the sum of the squared deviations ∑     
 
   
        
  is minimized. 
In non-parametric regression, the data is not summarized in terms of a small number of 
parameters a and b, but rather all data is kept and used for predictions (e.g. Russell & Norvig 
2009, Ch. 18.8.4). A simple non-parametric procedure is connect-the-dots. Somewhat more 
sophisticated is locally weighted regression, in which a regression problem has to be solved 
for every query point xq. The yq-value is determined as yq = aqxq + bq with the two parameters 
fixed by minimizing ∑                          
  
   . Here, K denotes a so-called 
kernel function that specifies the weight of the different xi depending on the distance to the 
query point xq in terms of a distance function d(). Of course, an xi should be given more 
weight the closer it is to the query point.  
Let us briefly reflect how these regression methods illustrate the differences between 
parametric and non-parametric modeling i) to iii). While in parametric regression, linear 
dependency is presupposed as a modeling assumption, the non-parametric method can adapt 
to arbitrary dependencies. In parametric regression, the nature of the functional relationship 
has to be independently justified by the theoretical context, which prevents an automation of 
the modeling process. Certainly, non-parametric regression also makes modeling 
assumptions, e.g. a suitable kernel function must be chosen that avoids both over- and 
underfitting. However, within reasonable bounds the kernel function can be chosen by cross-
validation. Since often, predictions turn out relatively stable with respect to different choices 
of kernel functions, an automation of non-parametric modeling remains feasible. 
While non-parametric regression is more flexible than parametric regression, it is also much 
more data-intensive and requires more calculation power. Notably, in the parametric case, a 
regression problem must be solved only once. Then all predictions can be calculated from the 
resulting parametric model. In the non-parametric case, a regression problem must be solved 
for every query point. In principle, each prediction takes recourse to all the data. While the 
parametric model consists in a relatively simple mathematical equation, the non-parametric 
model consists in all the data and an algorithmic procedure for making predictions. 
The main difference in terms of theoretical assumptions is that in parametric regression the 
type of functional dependency is presupposed in contrast to non-parametric regression. The 
latter again relies on eliminative induction. Essentially, it constitutes a case of Mill’s method 
of concomitant variations, which derives its inferential power from the method of difference 
as argued for example in Skyrms (2000, Sec. V.9) and Pietsch (2014, Sec. 3d). Thus, the 
conditions for identifying a causal relationship are largely the same as those discussed in the 
previous section—determinism, constancy of the background, and correct causal language—
resulting in the same premises in terms of theoretical assumptions a)-d). In particular, when 
mapping a functional dependency, all causally relevant conditions in the background must 
remain constant. And there must be sufficient data points such that the functional dependence 
can be traced in adequate detail. 
6. Conclusion: data-intensive science and exploratory experimentation 
We are finally in a position to evaluate the claims concerning a theory-free science. In both 
case studies, certain elements of theory had to be presupposed in order to yield reliable results 
in terms of causal structure that in turn can underwrite successful prediction and 
manipulation. In particular, among the considered parameters must be those that are causally 
relevant for a phenomenon in a considered context and not too many that are causally 
irrelevant to avoid spurious correlations. Also, the parameters should reflect adequate causal 
categories. Finally, the collected instances or observations should cover all configurations that 
are relevant in the given context. 
Because these aspects all concern the framing of the problem, one could speak of external 
theory-ladenness. By contrast, there is another kind of theory-ladenness that is largely absent 
from data-intensive science. For example, in classificatory trees no hypotheses are made 
about the causal connections that link the various parameters. Equally, in non-parametric 
regression, no assumptions are presupposed about the functional dependencies between 
different quantities. Thus, the essential difference in comparison with a hypothesis-driven 
approach is that not much is presupposed about the internal causal structure of the 
phenomenon. Rather, this structure is mapped from the data by parameter variation. 
How novel is this approach? On closer scrutiny, data-intensive science much resembles the 
practice of exploratory as distinguished from hypothesis-directed experimentation (Steinle 
1997, Burian 1997, Waters 2007; cp. also Vincenti 1993, 291). Exploratory experimentation 
essentially consists in the very same parameter variation of eliminative induction, where the 
experimenter tries to map the system of interest in all those states that she considers relevant. 
It is this common methodological core, which links exploratory experimentation and data-
intensive science and speaks against the claim, for example by Krohs (2012), that the latter 
constitutes a novel experimental approach focusing on data-gathering.  
Not surprisingly, the debate concerning theory-ladenness in exploratory experimentation 
parallels the discussion in the present article. For example, Steinle (2005) suggests a 
distinction between different kinds of theory-ladenness. According to this view, exploratory 
experimentation presupposes theoretical knowledge in terms of classification systems or 
empirical rules, but not in terms of theories that postulate empirically inaccessible abstract 
entities (285). Steinle refers to Duhem, Hacking and Cartwright as having drawn similar 
distinctions between an experimental/phenomenological and a theoretical level in scientific 
theories. Indeed, the distinction between exploratory and hypothesis-driven experimentation 
fits well with Hacking’s (1983) claim that experiments have a life of their own and 
Cartwright’s (1983) position of entity realism, which postulates a causal level in science that 
is mostly phenomenological and largely independent of the theoretical level. 
Building on Burian and Steinle’s work, Kenneth Waters emphasizes a subtle difference 
between ‘theory-directed’ and ‘theory-informed’. While in exploratory experimentation, 
background theories are used ‘to set up experiments, generate data, and draw conclusions’, 
such experiments ‘are not “directed” by the aim to test, develop, or otherwise articulate an 
existing theory or hypothesis.’ (2007, 280) Laura Franklin makes a similar point that 
exploratory experiments are theory-laden in terms of background knowledge, but not in terms 
of local theories (2005, 891). 
These remarks closely parallel the previous discussion regarding external and internal theory-
ladenness. The distinction between a phenomenological and a theoretical level is also helpful 
for the analysis of data-intensive science, which supposedly concerns the phenomenological 
level regarding local, causal structure of phenomena, but does not rise to the theoretical level.  
An important difference between exploratory experimentation and data-intensive science is 
that in the former, data is usually of experimental nature, while the latter often deals with 
observational data. But this is largely irrelevant from the perspective of a difference-making 
account of causation according to which experimental intervention has only pragmatic 
advantages over observational data. Another difference concerns the complexity of the 
phenomena. While mapping the causal structure by parameter variation is as old as science 
itself, carrying it out in the computer can address phenomena that were previously largely 
inaccessible to causal analysis. This new handle, which data-intensive science provides, for 
mapping the causal structure of highly complex phenomena will make all the difference to 
scientific practice.  
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